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Introduction 
 
 
Trade Policy Options for 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
TTIP, EPAs, WTO and African Integration 
Evita Schmieg 
Within the framework of a sustainable foreign trade policy, exports and imports repre-
sent a potentially important factor supporting economic and social development. The 
international level has proposed many objectives and instruments to harness that 
potential for the benefit of developing countries. Yet sub-Saharan Africa’s exports are 
still overwhelmingly unprocessed raw materials that make little contribution to value 
added and development. Decades of EU (and to some extent also US) trade preferences 
have produced little in the way of practical impacts for these countries, talks at the 
World Trade Organisation have progressed at snail’s pace, and the promised develop-
ment dividend has failed to materialise. Implementation of the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership will further sharpen the pressure of competition. Economic 
Partnership Agreements concluded with the European Union bring risks as well as 
opportunities. What possibilities do countries south of the Sahara have to promote 
sustainable development processes through foreign trade? And what support would 
the European Union and United States be able to offer? 
 
Thirty-four of the world’s forty-eight poorest 
countries (LDCs) lie in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
along with a majority of the poorer coun-
tries. And Africa has been making the 
slowest headway on the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) set for 2015. 
Progress has, however, been made on reduc-
ing poverty, according to the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa in its 2014 
MDG report. The proportion of the popu-
lation living on less than $1.25/day fell from 
57 percent in 1990 to 47 percent in 2011. 
Foreign trade represents the bulk of many 
sub-Saharan economies; for example, 89 
percent in Ghana, according to the World 
Bank. If progress is to be made towards 
those goals, strategies to reduce poverty 
and promote sustainable development 
must therefore grasp the opportunities 
potentially offered by foreign trade. That 
is why the MDGs included an indicator 
tracking access to the markets of the in-
dustrialised countries for products from 
the LDCs. International trade also plays a 
role in the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), which are currently under discus-
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sion to succeed the MDGs. Access to the 
markets of the industrialised countries, 
measured in terms of average tariffs, has 
improved considerably since the turn 
of the century, and the export subsidies 
granted by OECD countries, which harm 
local agriculture, have fallen. Between 
2000 and 2013 the countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa were able to expand their global 
exports from $94 to $424 billion, with a 
slightly positive balance of trade. 
The past decade has witnessed a major 
structural shift in the destinations of 
Africa’s exports. By 2013 Asia was taking 
the largest single share (34 percent), having 
already surpassed the European Union as 
largest trading partner in 2009. The Euro-
pean Union’s share has fallen from 36 per-
cent of sub-Saharan Africa’s exports in 2000 
to 25 percent in 2013, that of the United 
States more than halved from 22 percent to 
10 percent over the same period. Regional 
trade within sub-Saharan Africa accounts 
for 16 percent. 
The international community has repeat-
edly committed to encouraging a diversifi-
cation of exports from the poorest coun-
tries and improving their integration into 
the global economy, not least by the route 
of preferential trade agreements. But few 
countries have been able to use their pref-
erences to step up domestic value creation 
and increase exports. Under the Cotonou 
Agreement the European Union abolished 
tariffs on 97 percent of all imports of goods 
from African, Caribbean and Pacific states 
(the ACP), while its Everything but Arms 
Initiative exempts all imports from the 
poorest countries from tariffs and quotas. 
The United States has also granted selective 
preferences including more generous rules 
of origin in the African Growth and Oppor-
tunity Act (AGOA). Yet still the countries 
south of the Sahara continue to export pri-
marily raw materials: fuel, ores and metals 
together make up 70 percent of exports to 
countries outside the region, finished goods 
just 8 percent (2013 figures). It is therefore 
necessary to strengthen the contribution 
the foreign trade system makes to sustain-
able development through increasing value 
creation and creating jobs. The developing 
countries also see additional challenges in 
the shape of so-called mega-regionals. These 
very large free trade zones joining major 
economic blocs, such as the Transpacific 
Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), by 
nature discriminate against third countries. 
The WTO’s Doha Development 
Round 
The ministerial declaration at the begin-
ning of the world trade talks in the Qatari 
capital Doha in November 2001, shortly 
after the 11 September attacks, placed the 
“needs and interests” of the developing 
countries at the heart of the Doha Devel-
opment Agenda. A series of measures that 
would certainly have been suited to further 
that objective – and had been prioritised by 
the developing countries – were agreed in 
2005: duty-free and quota-free access to the 
markets of the industrialised countries and 
emerging economies for at least 97 percent 
of exports from the poorest countries; abo-
lition of agricultural export subsidies and 
comparable instruments by 2013; and ex-
pedited elimination of production subsidies 
for cotton from developed countries (in 
order to ease downward global price pres-
sure on an important export commodity, 
especially for West Africa). However, the 
political will to implement these decisions 
as a so-called “early harvest” (regardless of 
the overall outcome of the Round) proved 
to be lacking. 
Consequently the promise with which 
the Development Round began has yet to 
be kept. While the developing countries 
may also benefit from the WTO agreement 
on “trade facilitation” reached in December 
2013 in Bali, the topic was introduced by 
industrialised countries whose firms stand 
to benefit most from cutting bureaucracy 
at borders. At the same time, the legal 
and institutional reforms required to im-
plement trade facilitation are costly. The 
agreement therefore ties the obligation 
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to implement to the provision of develop-
ment support from industrialised coun-
tries. But because this requires time, there 
are question marks over implementation 
in many countries. Bali also prepared the 
ground for another important agreement. 
In response to Indian urgings, possibilities 
to support public stockpiling for food 
security are to be opened up, although 
further negotiations are still required. For 
most African countries the instrument 
will play no major role for the foreseeable 
future, because they simply lack the re-
sources to conduct such interventions. One 
clear indication of this is that only a small 
minority even of those countries that agreed 
to do so in the 2003 African Union Maputo 
Declaration on Agriculture and Food Secu-
rity are actually able to dedicate 10 percent 
of their budget to agriculture. So the out-
come of the WTO ministerial conference in 
Bali does not represent any progress on the 
development promise of the WTO Round, 
even if it was politically important in con-
firming the organisation’s status in the 
international system. 
TTIP and Third Countries 
While the effects of the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on third 
countries will manifest themselves only 
after the talks have concluded, the mecha-
nisms are already known. Typically for a 
bilateral free trade agreement, TTIP pursues 
the objective of reciprocal elimination of 
tariffs, potentially squeezing third coun-
tries out of markets in a process known as 
trade diversion. This would affect above all 
products that are presently still subject 
to high tariffs in the European Union and 
United States: textiles, shoes, agricultural 
products and foodstuffs. It would for 
example be harmful to Bangladeshi and 
Kenyan exports to Europe. These disadvant-
ages could be counteracted in certain third 
countries that are already integrated into 
the value chains for the EU and US markets, 
for example Morocco in the field of auto-
motive components. Opinions diverge over 
the possible effects of TTIP (see SWP Zeit-
schriftenschau 1/2014). 
It is even more difficult to assess the con-
sequences of regulatory agreements and 
harmonisation of standards. Far-reaching 
harmonisation would present a challenge 
especially to poorer countries with weaker 
institutions of quality infrastructure. In 
the European Union and the United States 
societal preferences are already driving 
product quality and improvements in the 
environmental and social conditions of 
production. In the long term, third coun-
tries must therefore continuously adapt to 
increasingly demanding markets. Already 
today, for example, 80 percent of Kenya’s 
agricultural exports are subject to private 
standards extending beyond official ones, 
whose fulfilment is required by major 
supermarket chains. 
But in connection with TTIP, harmonisa-
tion of rules and standards will probably 
not represent the normal case. Experience 
with the EU internal market shows that 
reciprocal recognition of rules and standards is 
easier to achieve. This could work to the 
advantage of third countries, whose prod-
ucts would at least no longer have to satisfy 
different standards and procedures for the 
EU and US markets (however demanding 
these may be). 
TTIP could also prove advantageous for 
third countries in the field of liberalisation 
of trade in services. The danger of trade 
diversion is much smaller here, because 
services markets are protected not through 
tariffs, but by regulatory measures such as 
restrictions on recognition of professional 
qualifications or requirements for the estab-
lishment of service companies. In many 
fields, trade preferences for services there-
fore presuppose reciprocal recognition or 
simplification of rules. The scope of this 
process could also be expanded to include 
third countries. However, where the labour 
market is affected, the political will to 
consider even small concessions to third 
countries is liable to be extremely limited, 
whether in the United States or the Euro-
pean Union. 
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The European Union and the United 
States together receive one third of sub-
Saharan Africa’s exports. TTIP will therefore 
definitely affect Africa, though the details 
will depend on the outcome of the nego-
tiations. In all probability tariffs will not be 
completely abolished, even if this remains 
an objective. WTO Director-General Pascal 
Lamy points out in the World Trade Report 
2011 that the highest tariffs are generally 
not lowered in free trade agreements. For 
precisely that reason, the positive effects of 
TTIP projected by econometric approaches 
are likely to be exaggerated. The European 
Union, for example, assumes that TTIP will 
bring economic gains amounting to €214 
billion annually. 
The Challenge of Implementing 
the EU-ACP Economic Partnership 
Agreement 
The countries of sub-Saharan Africa also 
face trade-related changes ensuing from 
the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
concluded in 2014 between the European 
Union and three African regions: the Eco-
nomic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the Southern African Develop-
ment Community (SADC), and the East 
African Community (EAC). All three provide 
for a reciprocal but asymmetrical liberalisa-
tion of trade in goods. The European Union 
already completely opened its own markets 
for goods from these regions in 2008. The 
African regions will only have to open their 
markets gradually during a transitional 
phase after the agreements come into effect: 
to a figure of 75 percent (ECOWAS) or about 
80 percent (the other two regions). Numer-
ous agricultural products will remain per-
manently excluded from the liberalisation. 
Under the agreement, the European Union 
is also abolishing its agricultural export 
subsidies to the EPA regions. 
Experience with the EPA in force since 
2008 between the European Union and 
Caribbean states supplies indications for 
the African regions. Few new trade flows 
have arisen between the European Union 
and the Caribbean, principally because of 
the dominant effects of internal factors such as 
input costs, infrastructure conditions and 
non-tariff impediments to market access. 
External factors, first and foremost the inter-
national economic crisis, also played a role. 
The importance of other factors is also 
underlined by the modest experience with 
one-sided preferential market access that 
the European Union granted the ACP states 
under the Cotonou Agreement. Preferred 
status for ACP did nothing to prevent Asian 
countries significantly expanding their 
exports to the European Union during the 
same period without preferences. Nonethe-
less, any improvement to this system, for 
example in relation to product coverage 
(United States) and rules of origin, could 
offer new opportunities. The United States 
has catching-up to do here, after the Euro-
pean Union has already taken steps in this 
direction with the EPA. 
To some extent EPAs remain politically 
contested. Not everyone regarded the trade 
talks with the European Union as a normali-
sation of hitherto post-colonial relations, 
instead fearing that the partial liberalisa-
tion towards the European Union would 
harm their internal economies. That cannot 
be confirmed by the experience of the 
Caribbean economies, where additional 
imports overwhelmingly affected products 
that did not fall under the EPA liberalisation 
and certain imports in fact had productiv-
ity-stimulating effects. Exceptions from lib-
eralisation in sensitive areas and long, grad-
ual transitional periods also play a role in 
ensuring that displacement by EU imports 
is unlikely (although not unthinkable). 
Fundamentally, however, it is conceiv-
able. While the EPAs include a series of pre-
cautions for dealing with negative effects, 
such as flexible protective mechanisms, 
policy space for industrial development, 
and impact monitoring, these can only 
fulfil their purpose if impacts on local 
labour markets and small businesses are 
actually subjected to systematic scrutiny. 
Tracking the economic and social conse-
quences of altered trade flows demands 
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sophisticated systems, and the mechanisms 
provided in the EPAs are not yet fully devel-
oped. Stakeholders in the regions should 
play an important role in monitoring, be-
cause they are likely to enjoy rapid access 
to relevant information. 
The effects of the EPAs on ongoing inte-
gration within the region also need to be 
closely observed. To date the agreements 
have played a positive role in certain re-
spects. It is unlikely that ECOWAS would 
have agreed its common external tariff in 
October 2013 without the pressure created 
by the EPA to develop new joint liberalisa-
tion proposals by 2014. Discussion on the 
Tripartite Free Trade Area that brings to-
gether EAC, COMESA (Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa) and SADC in 
south-eastern Africa started in 2008, after 
the EPA talks made it obvious that the prob-
lems caused by overlapping membership in 
multiple regional organisations could only 
be resolved by integration between these 
regions progressing faster than their exter-
nal opening. 
All the EPAs contain a clear commitment 
to regional integration and offer many op-
portunities to advance integration within 
the respective African partner regions. There 
remains, nonetheless, a danger that the 
EPA could lead to imports from the Euro-
pean Union displacing those from other 
sources in the region outside the regional 
integration groupings. Such a trade diver-
sion to the benefit of the European Union 
would be extremely undesirable under the 
aspect of sustainable development, and 
would contradict the goals of the agree-
ment. For that reason most EPAs contain 
a regional integration clause, stating that any 
market opening towards the European 
Union should also apply to other trading 
partners within the respective integration 
community. 
However, experience with the CARI-
FORUM EPA shows that certain countries 
neglect to implement this clause, fearing 
regional competition more than imports 
from the European Union. African coun-
tries also hold similar concerns vis-à-vis 
their integration partners. It must therefore 
be expected that implementation of regional 
integration clauses in Africa will be asso-
ciated with similar difficulties. And anyway, 
the clause only solves part of the problem. 
While it can prevent the European Union 
benefiting from trade diversion within the 
integration community (for example SADC), 
it fails to address the possibility of exports 
from neighbouring integration communi-
ties being diverted to the benefit of the 
European Union. Integration processes in 
the wider region (in other words between 
integration communities, such as the 
COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite), could suf-
fer through the EPAs. Now this danger is 
neither especially large nor acute, because 
transitional periods and generous excep-
tions provide only a gradual liberalisation 
towards the European Union, and imports 
from there are growing only slowly. More-
over, imports from the European Union 
will not generally be competing with prod-
ucts from the region. Nonetheless, mecha-
nisms should be developed to rule out the 
possibility of the European Union benefit-
ing to the detriment of regional partners. 
As well as the monitoring described above, 
this will require most of all political will 
on the part of African states to deepen inte-
gration between the regions. In fact there 
is a need for regional integration clauses 
between the integration communities. This 
would be an especially obvious move for 
the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite. 
The areas of cooperation under the EPAs, 
such as customs administration, sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures, and technical 
barriers to trade, also present a certain 
danger of the European Union benefiting 
to the detriment of other African partners. 
The agreements provide for intensified 
cooperation with the European Union on 
these issues, which contain great positive 
development potential because they often 
affect decisive internal conditions for pro-
duction and export. One potential undesir-
able side-effect of cooperation between 
individual EPA regions and the European 
Union would be if countries and regions 
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orientated their norms and standards more 
strongly on the European Union and neglect-
ed their connections with other African 
regions. The institutional cooperation and 
development support provided under the 
EPAs should therefore never forget that co-
operation must also be supra-regional and 
insights gained be made available to all the 
regions, in order to contribute at the same 
time to the intra-African integration 
process. 
Regional Integration in Africa 
There are several regional integration com-
munities in Africa, which studies by the 
African Union show to be active to very dif-
ferent degrees. Trade has developed espe-
cially dynamically in two regions. Trade 
within COMESA rose from $1.4 billion in 
2000 to $11.3 billion in 2013, representing 
an approximately eightfold increase, while 
the figure for the EAC increased more than 
sixfold within the same period, from $0.4 
to 2.7 billion. Intra-exports as a proportion 
of total exports almost doubled for COMESA, 
from 4.8 to 9.4 percent, and increased in 
the EAC from 17.7 to 19.5 percent (all data 
from the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, UNCTAD). A slight 
increase in intra-trade is found for sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole, although not 
within each and every integration com-
munity. 
Alongside the fundamental development 
problems – inadequate infrastructure, lim-
ited human capacities, scarce financial 
and other resources, difficulties accessing 
financing – intra-African trade is also im-
peded by the following specific factors: 
1.  Overlapping memberships in multiple 
regional organisations. Most countries belong 
to two or more integration communities. 
During the EPA talks this already created 
the problem of countries having to decide 
which regional configuration they wished 
to negotiate in. In the long term deeper 
integration will be required to resolve the 
contradictions produced by overlapping 
memberships. 
2.  Differences in political interest in integra-
tion. As the AU has noted, certain countries 
fear the political and economic power of 
stronger partners, and African integration 
consequently suffers from delays in imple-
menting agreements and unwillingness to 
relinquish aspects of sovereignty. 
3.  Strong regional protectionism. According 
to the AU, certain states impose tariffs aver-
aging 13.3 percent on imports from other 
African countries. That is higher than the 
continent’s average overall external pro-
tection, which is 8.7 percent. This not only 
fails to promote intra-African trade, but in 
fact discriminates against it in comparison 
to trade with countries outside Africa. The 
reason for this apparently counterintuitive 
situation is probably that while strong eco-
nomic interest in trade with other regions 
and the influence of the World Bank and 
IWF lead to tariff reductions on a most-
favoured-nation basis (i.e. applicable to all), 
these relate less to products that are largely 
traded within the region. This makes it 
especially problematic if the tariff conces-
sions granted to the European Union in the 
scope of the EPAs are not extended to other 
African regions. 
 
Although Africa’s intra-regional trade has 
exhibited average growth rates of 15 per-
cent over the past decade, intra-African 
trade has grown even faster. Two important 
lessons can be drawn from this: intra-Afri-
can trade possesses considerable potential – 
but this cannot necessarily be tapped with-
in the respective integration communities. 
In this context, and in view of the discus-
sion about multiple membership initiated 
by the EPAs, EAC, COMESA and SADC set 
up the Tripartite Free Trade Area, which 
is scheduled to launch in June 2015. The 
twenty-six member states of the Tripartite 
account for 57 percent of the population 
of the African Union and 58 percent of its 
GDP. The Tripartite is a significant element 
on the way to the planned African Con-
tinental Free Trade Area (CFTA). The AU 
decided in 2012 to realise the CFTA through 
a series of steps: implementation of the Tri-
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partite FTA by 2014, parallel completion of 
free trade areas in the other regions, con-
solidation of all the regional communities 
into a continental free trade area in 2015/ 
16, culminating in official inauguration of 
the CFTA in 2017. The possibility to modify 
the completion date in line with actual 
progress is explicitly mentioned, and has 
transpired to be necessary as developments 
have lagged behind the schedule. 
As well as growth in African trade out-
side the integration communities and the 
resolution of the problem of dual member-
ship, sub-Saharan Africa possesses a third 
essential economic interest in closer inte-
gration of African trade. This is the out-
standing prominence of finished goods 
in intra-African trade (2013: 40 percent; 
compared to 13 percent in Africa’s global 
trade, which is dominated by fuels with 53 
percent, followed by agricultural products 
(13 percent), and ores and metals (11 per-
cent). It is above all the manufacture of 
finished goods that generates value and 
attractive jobs in African countries, and 
thus makes an important contribution 
to sustainable development. This aspect 
has been woefully neglected by the short-
sighted discussion about the difficulties 
of regional integration in a context of com-
peting production structures. Although 
African economies compete in global mar-
kets with their exports of unprocessed 
commodities such as crude oil and raw 
coffee beans, competition with manufac-
tured products plays a much larger role in 
regional markets. And that means there is 
also potential for trade-stimulating effects 
of regional integration. 
Proposals and Recommendations 
The multilateral, bilateral and regional 
developments outlined above would sug-
gest that initiatives to strengthen sustain-
able development using foreign trade in-
struments need to act at multiple levels. 
1.  TTIP with precautions: the United States 
and European Union should adopt mea-
sures to ensure that the positive effects of 
TTIP on third countries are maximised and 
the negative minimised: 
 Transparency in the negotiations and in-
forming third countries about outcomes 
at an early stage would allow them to 
quickly identify possible consequences 
and prepare themselves. 
 Reciprocal recognition of regulations, 
norms and standards should be extended 
as far as possible to third countries. 
 Development aid should be used to assist 
the developing countries and LDCs to im-
prove their competitiveness in sectors 
affected by trade diversion. This includes 
strengthening quality infrastructure in 
order to enable them to fulfil stricter 
technical, sanitary and phytosanitary 
norms and standards. 
2.  Joint improvements to benefit the LDCs: 
In order to underline their commitment to 
the multilateral system – especially in the 
context of their far-reaching bilateral talks 
– the United States and European Union 
should complement the conclusion of the 
TTIP by implementing the WTO develop-
ment decisions of 2005: duty-free and 
quota-free access to markets for LDCs (this 
affects only the United States, as the Euro-
pean Union has already done), abolition 
of export subsidies and comparable instru-
ments, and reductions in cotton subsidies. 
3.  Strengthen the generalized systems of trade 
preferences for developing countries in the Euro-
pean Union and the United States: Potential for 
improvement exists in rules of origin and 
additional incentives for trade in products 
with higher social and environmental 
standards. Another option would be new 
preferences for the increasingly important 
service sector, extending beyond the con-
cessions that have been discussed in the 
scope of the multilateral WTO talks but 
have yet to be implemented in a binding 
form. 
4.  Development-positive implementation of 
the EPAs by the European Union and its partner 
regions: Further discussions about the point 
of EPAs in the individual regions are simply 
a waste of time and energy. The talks con-
cluded in 2014 and the agreements are now 
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reality; it is abundantly clear that there are 
no alternatives. Attention should now focus 
on instruments that can ensure that the 
EPAs have a positive effect on poverty-reduc-
tion, sustainable development and regional 
integration: 
 Expansion of monitoring systems to ac-
company implementation agreements 
and enable problems to be identified and 
tackled at an early stage; 
 Discussion of the implications for region-
al trade, implementation of regional in-
tegration clauses, and where possible the 
extension of such clauses to the whole of 
sub-Saharan Africa; 
 Development support to enable partner 
countries to benefit fully from the oppor-
tunities granted by the agreement. 
5.  Progress on African integration: Heighten-
ed competition under conditions of globali-
sation, ongoing loss of trade preferences (of 
already limited effectiveness), and positive 
experience with the value-creating contri-
bution of regional integration are all rele-
vant motivations to carry through decisions 
to deepen regional integration already 
adopted by African governments. Their 
earnest implementation must be pursued 
energetically. 
6.  Responsibility of African governments for 
their own development path and good govern-
ance: While unilateral trade preferences and 
free trade agreements can create a more 
favourable framework for foreign trade, 
African governments themselves determine 
many of the conditions for success within 
that framework, and frequently the more 
important ones. These include rule of law 
with transparent and democratic legislation 
and procedures, legal security enabling long-
term planning, and freedom from corrup-
tion to open up equal opportunities for all. 
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